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[Crim. No. 10399. In Bank. Dec. 23, 1966.]

THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LOUIS
EUGENE SUDDUTH, Defendant and Appcllant.
[1] Oriminal Law-Rights of Accused-Aid of Oounsel: Witnesses
-Self-IncriminatioD-Physical Examination.-Su!'lpects have
DO . constitutional right to refuse a test designed. to produce
physical evidence in the form of a breath sample, regardless of
whether counsel is present.
[2] Evidence-Physical Oondition-Intoxication.-A blood alcohol
test and the breath test for alcoholic absorption are alternate

[2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 347; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed·
§ 876).
!ticK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 107; Witnesses,
§ 24; [2] Evidence, § 490; [3] Criminal Law, §§ 103, 628(1); [4]
Automobiles and Other Road Vebicles, § 400(1); [5] Criminal
Law, § 621; [6] Criminal Law, § 625.
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means to determine the percentage of alcohol in the blood, and
the value of such objective scientific data of intoxication to
supplement the fallible observations by humans of behavior
seemingly symptomatic of intoxication cannot be disputed.
Criminal Law-Rights of Accused: Argument of CounselComment on Defendant's Failure to Testify.-The rule against
comment- on an accused's failure to testify is a necessary
protection for the exercise of the underlying privilege of
remaining silent, but a refusal to cooperate with law enforce·
ment officers does not qualify for such protection.
Automobiles- Offenses-Driving While Intoxicated-Instructions.-In a prosecution for the misdemeanor of driving while
intoxicated, where an instruction by the court on defendant's
refusal to submit to a sobriety test specifically referred to
refusal to take a breathalyzer test or other sobriety test after
he was made aware of the nature of the test and its effect, and
where the prosecutor did not comment on defendant's failure
to answer questions, but only on his refusal to take tests, it
could not be said that the jury was erroneously authorized to
consider, as evidence of guilt, defendant's exercise of his right
to remain silent in response to questions at the time of his
arrest.
Criminal Law-Argument of Counsel-Scope-Statements in
Refutation.-In a prosecution for the misdemeanor of driving--while ,intoxicated, defense counsel has the right to argue
reasons alternative to consciousness of guilt to explain defendant's refusal to take a sobriety test.
.
Id.-Argument of Counsel-Scope-Arguing Law.-The trial
court in a criminal case may, in its discretion, allow defense
counsel to incorporate correct statements of law in his argu.
ment, but the court must sustain an objection to an incorrect
statement of law, such as an incorrect assumption in argument
that one prosecuted for driving while intoxicated had the
constitutional right to refuse a breathalyzer test.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Municipal Court of the
Los Angeles Judicial District of Los Angeles County. Charles
M. H ughes, Judge. Affirmed.
Prosecution for misdemeanor of driving while intoxicated.
Judgment of conviction affirmed.
Morris Lavine, Norman T. Ollestad and Richard E. Erwin
for Defendant and Appellant.
Roger Arnebergh, City Attorney, Philip E. Grey, Assistant
City Attorney, and Michael T. Sauer, Deputy City Attorney,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
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TRAYNOR, C. J.-A municipal court jury found defendant guilty of the misdemeanor of driving while under the
influence of intoxicating liquor (Veh. Code, § 23102). J udgment was entered on the verdict, and defendant appealed,
contending that his privilege against self-incrimination was
violated by the admission of evidence of, and by the comment
on, his refusal to take a breathalyzer test to determine the
percentage of alcohol in his blood. The appellate department
of the superior court affirmed the judgment. The Court of
Appeal transferred the case on its own motion because of the
constitutional question involved (Cal. Rules of Court, rule
62(a» and affirmed the judgment. We granted a hearing
because substantially the same constitutional question was
before us in People v. Ellis, Crim. 10346, ante, p. 529 [55
Cal.Rptr. 385, 421 P.2d 393].
Officer Wilson of the Los Angeles Police Department testified that in response to a radio call reporting a driver under
the influence of intoxicating liquor he and a fellow officer
stopped defendant's car, which answered the radioed description and was observed making an unusual turning maneuver.
Defendant was very unsteady when he got out of his car and
approached the officers, and he produced his driver's license
only after considerable fumbling in his wallet. His breath
smelled strongly of alcohol.
Officer Wilson informed defendant of his rights to counsel
and to remain silent and that anything he said could be used
against him in a criminal proceeding. The officer then tried to
explain and demonstrate a series of tests, known collectively as
the Field Sobriety Examination, he proposed to administer to
defendant. The examination consists of physical tests, such as
walking a straight line, and a series of questions. While standing with the officers defendant was swaying to and fro and
kept up a running line of one-sided conversation with Officer
Wilson's partner. Defendant refused to take any of the physical tests and refused to answer any question except to respond
with exculpatory statements to the inquiry as to how much he
had drunk. Defendant was then taken to the police station
where the equipment necessary to administer a breathalyzer
test was assembled and its operation explained to him. He
refused to take the test.
The evidence of defendant's refusals to take tests was
commented on in the prosecutor's argument, and the jury was
instructed on the significance of such evidence.
The reasoning in People v. Ellis, Crim. 10346, decided
fl6C.Jd-li
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today, ante, p. 529 [55 Cal.Rptr. 385, 421 P.2d 393], is
fully applicable to the question whether evidence of and
comment on defendant's refusal to submit to a breathalyzer
test is constitutionally admissible. [1] Suspects have no
constitutional right to refuse a test designed to produce physi.
cal evidence- in the form of a breath sample (cf. ante, pp.
533-536; People v. Zavala (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 732, 738.
739 [49 Cal.Rptr. 129]; People v. Dawson (1960) 184 Cal.
App.2d Supp. 881, 883 [7 Cal.Rptr. 384]) whether or not
counsel is present (People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Ca1.2d 690, 709
[47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365]).
[2] We note that the physical and psychological disturbance of the individual involved in obtaining a breath sample is
apt to be significantly less than that involved in extracting a
blood sample, an evidence-gathering technique recently
approved in Schmerber v. Oalifornia (1966) 384 U.S. 757 [16
L.Ed.2d 908, 86 S.Ct. 1826], and that the blood alcohol test
and the breath test for alcoholic absorption are alternate
means for determining the percentage of alcohol in the blood. 1
The value of such objective scientific data of intoxication to
supplement the fallible observations by humans of behavior
seemingly symptomatic of intoxication cannot be disputed•
. (People y. Duroncelay (1957) 48 CaI.2d 766, 772 [312 P.2d
690] .) In a day whell excessive loss of life and property is
caused by inebriated ;drivers, an imperative need exists for a
fair, efficient,"and accurate system of detection, enforcement
and, hence, prevention. (See Breithaupt v. Abram (1957) 352
U.S. 432, 439 [1 L.Ed.2d 448,77 S.Ot. 408].)
.
As in Ellis (People v. Ellis, Crim.. 10346, ante, p .. 529
[55 Cal.Rptr. 385, 421 P.2d 393]), defendant's reliance --on Griffin v. Oalifornia, 380 U.S. 609 [14 L.Ed.2d 106, 85 S.Ct.
1229], must be rejected. [3] The sole rationale for the rule
against comment on a failure to testify is that such a rule is a
necessary protection for the exercise of the underlying· privilege of remaining silent (id. at p. 614). A wrongful refusal to
cooperate with law enforcement officers does not qualify for
such protection. A refusal that might operate to suppress evi·
dence of intoxication, which disappears rapidly with the
passage of time (In re Newbern (1959) 175 CaI.App.2d 862,
866 [1 Cal.Rptr. 80] ), should not be encouraged as a device to
escape prosecution.
lSee PeoplB v. Kovacik (1954) 205 Misc. 275, 282-290 [128 N.Y.S.2d
492, 499-506], tor a discussion ot the development of, and seientitle basia
for, the breath-te8tin~ tee1mique.
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The disparate results found in otller jurisdictions may be
ascribed to the presence or absence of an underlying constitutional or statutory right to refuse to produce the physical
evidence sought.2 States that recognize a right to refuse to
take such tests exclude evidence of a refusal. s States that
recognize no right to refuse allow testimony and comment 011
the refusal. 4
[4] It is contended that the instruction IS given by the
court on defendant's refusal to submit to a sobriety test
erroneously authorized the jury to consider defendant '8
silence in response to questions at the time of his arrest, when
such silence could not be considered evidence of guilt because
it was an exercise of his constitutional right.6 We do not
believe, however, that the jury would understand the instruction to refer to defendant's refusal to answer questions as
distinguished from his refusal to participate in a test. The
instruction specifically refers to refusal to take "a breathalyzer test or other sobriety test after he or she has been
[made] aware of the nature of the test and its effect" and the
prosecutor did not comment on defendant's failure to answer
questions, but only on his re~usal to take tests.
[5] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in
sustaining an objection to his counsel's argument to the jury
2See Note 87 A.L.R.2d 370.
8Not unanimously, however. (State v. Boc'k (1958) 80 Idaho 296 [328
P.2d 1065, 1071-1073].)
4See Note 87 A.L.R.2d 370.
Ii"YOU ARE INSTRUCTED that ina case where a defendant is
accused of violating Section 23101 of the Vehicle Code it is permissible
to prove that the defendant was offered a breathalyzer test or other
sobriety test after he or she has been aware of the nature of the test and
its effect. The fact that such test is refused under such circumstances is
not sufficient standing alone and by itself to establish the guilt of a
defendant but is a fact which if proven may be considered by you in the
light of all other proven facts in deciding the question of guilt or innoeence. Whether or not such conduct shows a consciousness of guilt and
the significance to be attached to such a circumstance are matters for your
,determination. ' ,
OBoth the federal rule, e.g., Ivey v. United States (1965) 344 F.2d 770,
772-773; Helton v. United States (1955) 221 F.2d 338, 341-342, applicable to the states through Malloy v. Hogan (1964) 378 U.S. 1 [12
L.Ed.2d 653, 84 S.Ct; 1489J, and our own rule, People v. Simmons (1946)
28 Cal.2d 699, 718-719 [172 P.2d 18], might have operated to exclude
the testimony of defendant's silence in response to questions by tbe police.
(Cf. Griffin v. Oalifornia (1965) supra, 380 U.S. 609, 614.) Defendant's
failure to object precludes his challenging the admission of the evidence
of refusal to answer questions. The issue here, tberefore, is limited to the
propriety of the jury instruction.
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on his refusal to take the sobriety test." Counsel has the right
to argue reasons alternative to consciousness of guilt to
explain defendant's refusal. [6] Moreover, the court may
in its discretion even allow counsel to incorporate correct
statements of law in his argument (People v. Linden (1959)
52 Ca1.2d 1, 29 [338 P.2d 397] ; People v. Dykes (1930) 107
Cal.App. 107, 118 [290 P. 102]), but it must sustain an objection to an incorrect statement of law (Peop18 v. Atwood, 214
Cal.App.2d 308, 309 [29 Cal.Rptr. 463]). In the present case
the court sustained an objection to, and ordered stricken, only
that part of counsel's argument that incorrectly assumed that
defendant had a constitutional right to refuse the test.
The judgment is affirmed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Mosk, J., Burke, J.,
Peek, J., ~ concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied January
19, 1967.
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1" I submit there is a lot of evidence about refusing to take the test.
It is always kind of puzzling to me how they can advise somebody, 'Now,
listen, Mr. Sudduth, you don't have to take this test it you don't want to.
You can see an attorney if you want to.' Or I You don't have to make
any statement it you don't want to.' And then they are amazed or

astounded when the man says, I Well, you advised me of my rights; I'n-follow your advice. I won't take the test.' They make a big thing out
of refusal to take the test. 1 am wondering abouf tlls sf/ect 01 a C01&8ti-

tuti01&al right

you i1l court.
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wlle1l you take advantage 01 it ami if U 1/,8ed against

I I MR. REISNER : Well, your Honor, that would be a matter of law and
it has certainly been decided it is a valid comment and inference.
I I THE COURT: The last comment of counsel will be stricken. They are
not to decide the legal aspects of what is a Constitutional right and what
is not. That will be stricken." (Italics added.)
·Retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court sittinlr under assilrn•
ment by the Chairman of the Judicial Council.
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